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COMMENT: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
AND THE COURTS
ROBERT J. JACKSON, JR.*
I
INTRODUCTION
I am grateful to all of the participants in this symposium for the enlightening
scholarship featured in this issue. By bringing together scholars of
administrative law, financial regulation, and securities law, the editors have
given us a rare opportunity—at a critical moment in all three fields—to consider
how lessons drawn from each area should inform policymakers grappling with
regulating financial markets of dazzling complexity. The articles that I comment
on here show why the enterprise of bringing these fields together is worth the
candle. Professor Coates has offered a detailed analysis of the challenges that
1
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) poses for regulatory management, and Professor
Cox has described, in striking terms, the influence that the increased
2
prominence of CBA will have on securities regulation in the years to come.
This comment makes a much more modest claim. I argue only that,
whatever position one takes about the appropriate role of CBA in financial
regulation, all should agree that the courts should play virtually no role in
conducting or reviewing that analysis. The argument is less my own, I think,
than the inevitable consequence of a careful reading of the scholarship in this
issue. But it is an important argument to make, because, as explained below, the
law currently invites far more judicial participation in financial-regulation CBA
than it should.
Part II of this comment reviews the now-familiar reasons why courts are illsuited to assess, or even closely to review an agency’s assessment of, the costs
and benefits of financial regulation. Part III explains why any policymaker—
whatever her views about the proper role of CBA in financial regulation—
should prefer that courts not play a significant role in shaping that analysis. Part
IV describes steps that lawmakers should take to limit the role the courts will
play in shaping CBA in financial regulation in the future. Part V concludes.
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2. James D. Cox, Iterative Regulation of Securities Markets after Business Roundtable, 78 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 25.
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Before proceeding, I note that both Professor Coates and Professor Cox
sharply criticize the courts’ recent contretemps with CBA, and especially the
3
decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC. Those critiques are important. But in
this comment, I focus my attention elsewhere. In my view, courts are not to
blame for having fared poorly in reviewing financial regulation CBA. Instead,
Congress is to blame for having invited federal judges to a task for which they
are so obviously ill-suited. Thus, my project is to convince lawmakers to limit
the courts’ role in an area where, all should agree, judges simply do not belong.
II
COURTS’ INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE TO CONDUCT FINANCIALREGULATION CBA
Arguments about the institutional limits of the judiciary are well-worn, and
a comprehensive assessment of those claims is both beyond the scope of this
4
comment and unnecessary for our purposes. Instead, in this part, I simply offer
three reasons why the institutional design of the courts renders them incapable
to conduct or carefully review financial-regulation CBA.
First, generalist federal judges and their law clerks obviously lack the
expertise necessary to closely review the type of CBA that would justify a
particular regulatory choice in today’s financial markets. Of course this is an
objection that can be—and has been—raised about all judicial review of
5
specialized agency rulemaking. Whether financial-regulation CBA is
particularly complex, and hence especially beyond the grasp of the courts, is
6
debatable. For purposes of this comment, however, I take no position on

3. 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (vacating an SEC rule because the SEC “failed once again . . .
adequately to assess the economic effects of a new rule”); see, e.g., Coates, supra note 1, at 11 (arguing
that “[the appropriate] degree of deference has increasingly not been afforded” by the D.C. Circuit to
cost-benefit analysis conducted by agencies); Cox, supra note 2, at 28 (“The Business Roundtable
decision is a model of injudicious decisionmaking.”); James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The
Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1840 (2012).
4. For an especially influential presentation of these arguments, see, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1994); see also Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393 (1996).
5. Many commentators, for example, have criticized the courts’ interventions in the area of
environmental law, where judicial review frequently entails weighing competing, complex and
contested analysis of regulatory choices. See, e.g., B. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS:
THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 343–45 (1983) (arguing that, in the context of EPA rules, there
have been significant “uintended and undesirable consequences of court action”).
6. My colleague Jeffrey Gordon has argued that, because financial regulation is uniquely complex
and legally constructed, judicial review of CBA in this area is especially quixotic. Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Empty Call for Cost-Benefit Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S2, S351 (2014).
But see, e.g., Ryan Bubb, Comment, The OIRA Model for Institutionalizing CBA of Financial
Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2015 at 48–52 (although Professor Gordon’s “objection
boils down to a concern that it is hard to quantify the benefits and costs of financial regulation” in
particular, Professor Bubb “share[s] [Professor Gordon’s] skepticism about judicial review of CBA”
more generally).
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whether financial-regulation CBA is sui generis in this respect. My claim is only
that federal judges and their law clerks are ill-suited to conduct or even to
carefully review CBA in the area of financial regulation.
To briefly recount three reasons why this is so, note that Article III
personnel have little background even in basic principles of microeconomics, to
say nothing of the training in dynamic macroeconomic systems necessary to
7
conduct financial-regulation CBA. Few have meaningful previous experience
at any federal regulatory agency, never mind the training at a significant federal
financial regulator that should inform judgments about costs and benefits in this
8
area. And even fewer have professional background in the financial-services
industry, which could provide a basis for critical consideration of industry’s
arguments regarding the costs and benefits of a particular rule. Federal judges
and their law clerks have virtually none of the training or expertise that would
prepare them for the challenging analytical task of conducting or reviewing
financial-regulation CBA.
Second, even if judges were sufficiently expert to review CBA in this area,
the adversarial nature of litigation is unlikely to produce the kinds of analysis
amenable to such a review. The reason is that any thoughtful analysis of costs
and benefits of financial regulation will necessarily change over time as market
actors respond to shifting conditions and more data become available. In
litigation defending their regulatory choices, however, agencies are rightly loath
to change their position, lest the regulator’s shifting conclusions toll the bell of
9
arbitrariness. Litigation over costs and benefits is not the same as analysis of
costs and benefits, and courts have the opportunity to review only the former,
10
not the latter.
Finally, as Professor Coates has cogently explained in this issue, careful
review of CBA requires an assessment not only of the CBA itself but the
11
organizational choices that produced it. To involve judges in the review of

7. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at S351–55 (describing financial regulatory systems as, by their
nature, dynamic).
8. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMUELE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (identifying this fact as one of many reasons why judges
should be particularly deferential to expert agency interpretations).
9. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–42
(1983) (for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012) (APA), “rescission or
modification of” a previously promulgated regulation is subject to similar judicial scrutiny as the
agency’s initial adoption of its rules).
10. That is why it is unsurprising that, in Business Roundtable, the court concluded that the SEC
had assessed costs and benefits “opportunistically.” Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148
(D.C. Cir. 2011). All litigants shape their arguments opportunistically. There is no reason to expect that
a federal agency, when required to defend its regulatory choices in episodic litigation, will behave
differently from any other litigant.
11. See generally Coates, supra note 1 (explaining that, in light of the complexity of financial
markets, financial regulators should depart from traditional models of regulation, including through an
unusual level of transparency, flexibility, and willingness to experiment with relatively new regulatory
approaches such as randomization). See also Robert Bartlett, The Institutional Framework in CostBenefit Analysis in Financial Regulation: A Tale of Four Paradigms?, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S379 (2015).
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CBA, he has shown, implicates them in the management of the agency. The
Business Roundtable decision, for example, has often been interpreted as
12
suggesting that the SEC employ more staff with formal training in economics
and that economists should have far more influence on the Commission’s
13
decisions than they have had in the past. That is a policy recommendation with
which, as it happens, I agree. But the federal judiciary is in no position to make
that judgment.
For the reasons that Professor Coates has given, it is no answer to say, as the
courts sometimes have, that concluding that a particular regulatory choice is not
justified by the agency’s underlying analysis is not the same as dictating
14
particular analytical choices to that agency. As he has shown, when the law
invites judges to examine a financial regulator’s policy decisions, that
examination will necessarily implicate the agency’s managerial choices. For that
reason, what is troubling about Business Roundtable is not so much the decision
itself. Instead, it is the fact that our Nation’s central securities regulator,
responsible for markets that store trillions of dollars of Americans’ wealth, has
reorganized its approach to economic analysis of regulation based not on its
own expert judgment but on the views of three randomly selected, unelected
15
generalist judges.

12. Most importantly for present purposes, the Commission itself accepted Business Roundtable as
imposing such a mandate. See, e.g., SEC Hires More Economists to Ensure Good Cost-Benefit Analysis,
ABA DODD-FRANK TRACKER (Apr. 17, 2012), http://regreformtracker.aba.com/2012/04/sec-hiresmore-economists-to-ensure.html (noting testimony by then-Chairman Mary Schapiro before the House
of Representatives’ Oversight and Government Reform Committee describing the “hiring of 17 new
PhD economists” to “avoid overturned rules in the future”).
13. See, e.g., Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative Proposals to Improve and Enhance the Securities and
Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 77 (2011) (testimony
of Prof. J.W. Verret) (describing the “low priority the Commission places on economic analysis”).
14. See Coates, supra note 1, at 10–13.
15. In the wake of Business Roundtable, the Commission announced a significant restructuring of
its approach to economic analysis of rulemaking in the form of guidance issued by its General Counsel
at the direction of the Chairman. See Memorandum from the SEC’s Office of the General Counsel to
SEC Staff of Rulewriting Divisions and Offices (Mar 16, 2012), available at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/ rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf. As noted above,
such a reorganization may well have been warranted. In fact, many have argued that one benefit of
Business Roundtable was to convince the Commission to engage in much-needed rethinking about its
approach to economic analysis. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial
Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015). Others have contended that the
changes are mere window dressing designed to better prepare the Commission for litigation in the D.C.
Circuit. See, e.g., Comment, Leen Al-Alami, Business Roundtable v. SEC: Rising Judicial Mistrust and
the Onset of a New Era in Judicial Review of Securities Regulation, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 541 (2014). This
comment does not focus on whether the SEC’s response to Business Roundtable was, in fact, desirable.
Instead, my claim is that, if such a reorganization was in fact warranted from a policy perspective, a
reorganization of the Nation’s principal securities regulator would have better been identified and
structured through analysis by an institution other than the federal judiciary.
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III
THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE DESIRABILITY OF CBA TO THE ROLE OF THE
COURTS
Having explained why the courts are ill-suited to review CBA of financial
regulation, in this part I contend that, regardless of the position one takes as to
the appropriate role of CBA, all should agree that the judiciary is not the
institution that should conduct that analysis. As the articles featured in this
symposium have shown, views about the appropriate approach to CBA, and
what we can hope for CBA to achieve in the area of financial regulation, vary
widely. Whatever one’s views on these questions, however, it is hard to see why
policymakers should prefer giving the judiciary a prominent role in this area.
A wide range of experts are deeply divided with respect to how prominent a
role CBA should play in financial policymakers’ decisions. Some argue that
CBA proving that benefits exceed costs should be a legal prerequisite to
16
financial regulatory authority. Others contend that CBA in this area is often
necessarily indeterminate, and so regulatory choices can and often should be
17
made in the absence of conclusive evidence. Several authors in this issue find
18
themselves in between. Whatever view of this question a lawmaker adopts,
however, it is unclear why she should want the judiciary to have a significant
role in the review of CBA prepared by financial regulators.
To begin, consider lawmakers who take the view that convincing CBA
should be required for any new rulemaking. At first blush, it may seem that
these lawmakers should favor robust judicial review of CBA. The theory would
be that, deterred by the prospect of such judicial review, financial regulators
would conduct careful, objective CBA, as the lawmaker wishes them to do,
before proceeding with new regulatory initiatives. For two reasons, however,
lawmakers who advocate requiring convincing CBA for any new rulemaking
19
should still not favor extensive judicial review of CBA in this area.
First, as noted in part I, the prospect of judicial review is not likely to
produce methodologically sound CBA. Instead, it is likely to produce CBA
designed to serve the purposes of agency litigation. These are, of course, rather
different things. In fact, the prospect of litigation may well curb the agency’s use
of truly objective CBA, which is frequently ambiguous as to the desirability of
any particular rule and which is likely to evolve over time. Thus, for this
16. See, e.g., Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act, S. 1615, 112th Cong. § 3(b)(4)(A) (2011)
(providing that an agency may not issue a final rule if the agency “determines that [the rule’s]
quantified costs are greater than [its] quantified benefits”).
17. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at S374–75.
18. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 15, at 898–902 (examining previous case studies regarding the
effects of CBA throughout the American administrative state).
19. As explained below, that is not to say that these lawmakers should not favor requiring the
agency itself to conduct extensive CBA in connection with new rulemaking. Of course they should. My
comment, however, focuses on whether lawmakers with these views should favor giving the judiciary
the power to oversee the analysis the agency pursues in service of that statutory mandate. For the
reasons given in the text, they should not.
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lawmaker, extensive judicial review risks undermining the very CBA she hopes
to encourage the financial regulator to use.
Second, as Professor Cox has explained in this issue, lawmakers should not
expect agencies to respond to the prospect of judicial review by continuing to
regulate in the same manner despite repeated judicial rejection of their
20
rulemaking efforts. Instead, lawmakers should expect agencies to respond as
the SEC has to Business Roundtable: by pursuing alternative types of regulation
that are not subject to close judicial scrutiny. Lawmakers who advocate the use
of CBA should not want to give agencies reason to reduce the incidence of
formal rulemaking that triggers CBA requirements in the first place. Nor is it
clear why they would prefer for more financial regulation to occur through
21
those alternative regulatory channels.
So there is little reason for lawmakers who favor the use of CBA in financial
regulation to want judges to play a significant role in reviewing such analysis.
What about those who prefer, as a matter of policy, that CBA play a less
22
prominent role in the work of financial regulators? It is even harder to see why
these legislators would want judges to have extensive authority to review the
work of financial policymakers. For one thing, as noted in part I, judicial review
of this type has significant implications for the management of the agency,
focusing its resources on economic analysis that, at least for this lawmaker, are
of limited value. For another—and, for this lawmaker, more importantly—the
agency’s attempts to create rules that can be defended in subsequent CBA
litigation may skew financial regulation in an undesirable fashion.
Whatever the lawmaker’s view as to the feasibility and importance of CBA
in financial regulation, then, it is hard to see why she should favor giving the
judiciary a significant role in this area. Two more arguments why some
lawmakers might prefer this arrangement, however, are worth considering. The
first is that robust judicial review of CBA helps to preserve the status quo by
increasing the costs of changing the existing regulatory scheme. The second is
that extensive review of CBA shifts power from financial regulatory agencies to
20. See Cox, supra note 2, at 35–36 (noting that the SEC can, and by all accounts will, respond to
Business Roundtable by emphasizing its regulatory powers in the form of enforcement and informal
safe harbors; for that reason, Professor Cox explains, “[w]hile it is correct to say that Business
Roundtable imposes a significant restraint on SEC rulemaking, it is not correct to conclude that the
decision has the same degree of restraint on the SEC as a regulator”). If there was any doubt as to
whether the SEC and other financial regulators would use this tactic in response to Business
Roundtable, Professor Cox has eliminated it by showing them the way.
21. It might be argued that legislators could respond to the agency’s strategy by expanding the
types of regulation that are subject to CBA to include matters such as enforcement decisions and
informal regulatory guidance. This argument, however, is unpersuasive, because the manifestations of
federal regulatory power in financial markets are many, and lawmakers are not so naïve as to believe
that they can identify every alternative method of financial regulation and subject it to stringent CBA.
Lawmakers attempting to do this will find that agencies respond simply by focusing their activities on
another mode of regulation.
22. Lawmakers may take this position because, for example, they have concluded that financialregulation CBA is so indeterminate as to be unlikely meaningfully to improve regulatory outcomes.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 6, at S371–75.
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Congress, for the latter institution is the only one that can enact financial
regulation that can survive judicial review. For the reasons that follow,
however, neither claim should lead lawmakers to favor giving the courts a
significant role in reviewing financial-regulation CBA.
The argument that extensive judicial review of CBA is valuable to
lawmakers because it preserves the status quo proceeds in a fashion that is very
23
familiar to experts in administrative law. Elected officials worry that, when
their party is out of power, regulators appointed by their opponents will adopt
policies contrary to the interests of the minority’s constituents. Lawmakers
averse to this risk therefore seek limits on majoritarian regulatory authority.
Judicial scrutiny of CBA is, on this view, a useful check on the majority’s
control of the administrative state.
Judicial review of CBA, however, is a rather ineffective antimajoritarian
check on financial regulation. For one thing, it does nothing to address policies
that the majority is able clearly to justify as a matter of CBA—however
objectionable those policies may be to the minority. For another, it is
unreliable: the majority’s lawmaking is halted only if a randomly selected panel
of D.C. Circuit judges concludes that the CBA in question is inadequate. It also
pales in comparison to the checks already in place in this area: Senate
confirmation of every senior financial regulator and Congressional control over
most of their budgets. These institutional arrangements give the minority far
more comfort regarding majoritarian control of financial regulation than
judicial review of CBA can.
Nor does the claim that judicial review of CBA shifts regulatory power from
federal agencies to Congress establish the desirability of such review. It is true
that, in response to judicial intervention in this area, Congress has enacted
increasingly detailed statutes that dictate regulatory choices, shielding those
24
choices from judicial scrutiny of CBA. But requiring more policy choices to be
memorialized before the fact in the United States Code is very unlikely to
improve the quality of financial regulation. For one thing, as my colleagues in
this symposium have noted, effective financial regulation often takes the form
of ex post application of standards rather than ex ante rules. For another,
Congress lacks the expertise necessary to make even those ex ante rules that
23. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1243, 1318 (1999) (“Judicial review of administrative rulemaking builds in a substantial . . .
status quo bias.”).
24. For a recent example, see, e.g., Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223, § 953 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49, and 112 U.S.C.). In that controversial
provision, which required the SEC to make rules requiring public companies to disclose the ratio of the
Chief Executive Officer’s pay to the pay of the company’s median employee, Congress statutorily fixed
the definition of “total compensation,” leaving the Commission unable to make adjustments to that
definition that would have reduced the costs of compliance with that rule. Id. § 953(b)(2) (“For
purposes of this subsection, the total compensation of an employee . . . shall be determined in
accordance with [SEC regulations] as in effect on the day before the date of enactment of this Act.”
(emphasis added)).
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would reflect sound policy judgments. And as recent experience has shown,
policy mistakes committed by statute are far more difficult and expensive to
25
reverse than those committed by rulemaking.
IV
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF FINANCIAL REGULATION
So the case for close judicial review of financial-regulation CBA is
exceptionally weak. The courts lack required expertise; litigation is ill-suited for
the purpose; regardless of one’s views of CBA in this area, judicial scrutiny of
CBA is unlikely to be helpful; and even political economy offers little basis for
thinking judicial review is desirable. At this point, the reader could be forgiven
for wondering: How did we get here? That is: Given that the case for judicial
intervention in this area is so flawed, why do Article III judges play such a
prominent role in the modern financial regulatory state?
The answer is that this is what Congress has asked the courts to do. As
misguided as the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Business Roundtable may or may not
be, it cannot be said to be without statutory basis. For the law requires, and
indeed has long required, the Securities and Exchange Commission to bear a
26
“unique obligation” with respect to CBA of its rules. The National Securities
Market Improvement Act of 1996 mandates that the Commission,
“[w]henever . . . engaged in rulemaking . . . shall also consider, in addition to the
protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition,
27
and capital formation.” Although it is far from clear on the text of the statute
alone that this provision imposes additional CBA obligations on the
Commission, the D.C. Circuit made clear a decade ago that it intends to read
28
the law in this way. And Congress—even in connection with its recent
overhaul of financial regulation—left that statute untouched, inviting judges to
29
continue to play a significant role in financial-regulation CBA.
25. Consider, for example, the SEC’s limited freedom to address commentators’ concerns
regarding the costs of implementing § 953 of Dodd–Frank. See Securities and Exchange Commission,
Pay Ratio Disclosure, Release Nos. 33-9452, 34-70443, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
2013/33-9452.pdf (“Many commentators raised concerns about the significant compliance costs that
could result from requiring the use of ‘total compensation’ as defined in the statute,” but the
Commission was required to “comply with the statutory mandate.”).
26. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f) (2012) (emphases added).
28. See Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating an SEC
rule on the basis of this statutory language and the court’s conclusion that the Commission’s analysis
reflected an inadequate consideration of certain costs).
29. Strikingly, the House of Representatives’ principal response to the Business Roundtable
decision was to hold hearings on whether the law should require further judicial intervention in this
area. See, e.g., SEC Regulatory Accountability Act, H.R. 2308, 112th Cong. (2012). Among other
things, that bill would have required the SEC to conduct more extensive CBA, to choose the regulatory
approach that, in light of that CBA, “maximize[s] net benefits,” and to review all of its existing
regulations for compliance with that approach. See id. § 2. Although the bill did not become law, at
related congressional hearings observers offered still other bases on which federal judges might be
invited to intervene with respect to financial-regulation CBA. See, e.g., Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative
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Lawmakers concerned about the role of CBA in financial regulation should
limit the courts’ authority in this area. Rather than requiring financial
regulators to satisfy judicial definitions of impossibly capacious statutory
30
language, the law should expressly limit judicial review of financial-regulation
CBA.
Although the precise nature of those limits is beyond the scope of this
comment, I note that Congress has ample institutional capacity to circumscribe
judicial review in this area. For example, Congress could clarify that courts
evaluating financial-regulation CBA are bound to accept the agency’s factual
31
determinations and the weight the agency assigns to competing evidence. In
addition, in light of the scholarship in this issue showing that CBA in financial
regulation is at least as analytically indeterminate as CBA in other contexts, it is
hard to see why financial regulators should bear a “unique[ly]” heavy burden of
proof regarding CBA. Now that Congress is aware that the language it chose to
guide financial-regulation CBA has imposed that burden, it is incumbent upon
Congress—not the courts—to remove it. Congress should make clear what the
scholars in this issue have so clearly shown: that courts are no better suited to
intervening in CBA in the area of financial regulation than in any other.
Before concluding, I note that this comment has not considered whether
Congress should, when modifying the judicial standard of review for CBA,
simultaneously direct financial-regulatory agencies to engage in more extensive
CBA, for example by making such CBA a prerequisite to rulemaking. Such an
arrangement might reflect an appropriate political compromise among
32
lawmakers with varying perspectives on the value of CBA in this area. And, in
fact, that arrangement, unlike the status quo, might well achieve the laudable
Proposals to Improve and Enhance the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 77 (2011) (testimony of Prof. J.W. Verret) (arguing that federal law
should also require the Commission to evaluate, subject to judicial review, the effects of its rules on
“the traditional role of states” in corporate law).
30. One commentator has likened the statutory requirement that the Commission consider
“efficiency, competition, and capital formation” in connection with rulemaking to requiring regulators
carefully to consider “apple pie and puppies.” J.W. Verret, Efficiency, Competition, Capital Formation,
Investor Protection, Apple Pie and Puppies, TRUTH ON THE MARKET: ACADEMIC COMMENTARY ON
LAW, BUSINESS, ECONOMICS AND MORE (Aug. 4, 2011), http://truthonthemarket.com/2011/08/04/
efficiency-competition-capital-formation-investor-protection-apple-pie-puppies/. Although bemoaning
the indeterminacy of the statutory language that governs judicial review of CBA, however, that
commentator—and others—have nevertheless attempted to divine its true meaning. See id.; see also
Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983 (2013). In my view, Congress should change these words rather than
invite nonexpert federal judges to endow them with meaning in CBA litigation.
31. As a matter of administrative law the courts are already bound to accept factual findings of
agencies with a substantial basis in the record. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 32–33 (1992). But in
the context of financial regulation the courts do not appear prepared to give the SEC that deference,
perhaps in light of the statutory language imposing a “unique obligation” on the Commission to justify
its rules, compare id. with Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1151 (deeming “relatively unpersuasive”
the studies the Commission relied upon to justify the rules struck down in that case).
32. See supra text accompanying notes 18–23 (considering lawmakers with heterogeneous views
regarding the value of CBA in the financial-regulatory context).
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end of encouraging financial regulators to take the costs and benefits of their
choices more seriously. At a minimum, however, this approach would vest
responsibility for conducting that analysis in the institution best suited to the
myriad analytical challenges of financial-regulation CBA. As this comment has
shown, the judiciary is comparatively ill-suited to conduct that work.
V
CONCLUSION
The scholarship in this symposium adds a great deal to our understanding of
the organizational, analytical, and legal challenges of conducting meaningful
analysis of the costs and benefits of financial regulation in today’s markets.
Professor Coates’s work shows why meaningful CBA in this area demands new
33
methods of regulatory management, and Professor Cox has explained how and
34
why such analysis is likely to shape securities regulation in the years to come.
By contrast, this comment has offered a far narrower view. I have argued
only that, whatever one’s view about the value of CBA in financial regulation,
the judiciary is institutionally ill-positioned to conduct that analysis. For that
reason, lawmakers should move promptly to clarify the limits of judicial review
of financial-regulation CBA. It is no surprise that Article III judges have
struggled to produce satisfying review of CBA in the increasingly complex area
of financial regulation. What is surprising is that Congress continues to invite
extensive judicial intervention in this increasingly important area of the modern
regulatory state.

33. See Coates, supra note 1.
34. See Cox, supra note 1.

